Difference between revisions of "Translations:How VeriBlock PoP vBFI Protects Altchains/15/en"

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Latest revision as of 19:38, 22 July 2021

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Message definition (How VeriBlock PoP vBFI Protects Altchains)
The software which produces the block security statistics proactively looks at the publications for a particular security-inheriting chain in a particular security-providing chain to determine ''whether it is mathematically possible for an attacker to reorganize the security-inheriting chain without also reorganizing the security-providing chain''. In the example of VeriBlock or altchains secured using VeriBlock, BFI ''indicates whether it is mathematically possible to reorganize a particular VeriBlock/altchain block without 51% attacking Bitcoin'' (and if it isn't, how many Bitcoin blocks would have to be reversed), and ''whether an attacker is currently publishing malicious fingerprints of a reorganization of the VeriBlock/altchain'' (and if so, which blocks are in danger of being reorganized from the published fingerprints of the attack).
TranslationThe software which produces the block security statistics proactively looks at the publications for a particular security-inheriting chain in a particular security-providing chain to determine ''whether it is mathematically possible for an attacker to reorganize the security-inheriting chain without also reorganizing the security-providing chain''. In the example of VeriBlock or altchains secured using VeriBlock, BFI ''indicates whether it is mathematically possible to reorganize a particular VeriBlock/altchain block without 51% attacking Bitcoin'' (and if it isn't, how many Bitcoin blocks would have to be reversed), and ''whether an attacker is currently publishing malicious fingerprints of a reorganization of the VeriBlock/altchain'' (and if so, which blocks are in danger of being reorganized from the published fingerprints of the attack).

The software which produces the block security statistics proactively looks at the publications for a particular security-inheriting chain in a particular security-providing chain to determine whether it is mathematically possible for an attacker to reorganize the security-inheriting chain without also reorganizing the security-providing chain. In the example of VeriBlock or altchains secured using VeriBlock, BFI indicates whether it is mathematically possible to reorganize a particular VeriBlock/altchain block without 51% attacking Bitcoin (and if it isn't, how many Bitcoin blocks would have to be reversed), and whether an attacker is currently publishing malicious fingerprints of a reorganization of the VeriBlock/altchain (and if so, which blocks are in danger of being reorganized from the published fingerprints of the attack).