Difference between revisions of "Translations:How VeriBlock PoP vBFI Protects Altchains/23/en"

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Message definition (How VeriBlock PoP vBFI Protects Altchains)
Eventually the attacker gave up and stopped building their offline chain (and performing PoP publications of it), because the victim they were trying to double-spend against refused to confirm their transaction until BFI indicated that the attack was resolved, and that the block containing the transaction in question achieved Bitcoin-finality (it is mathematically impossible now to reverse that VeriBlock block unless a 51% attack of Bitcoin occurred as well).
TranslationEventually the attacker gave up and stopped building their offline chain (and performing PoP publications of it), because the victim they were trying to double-spend against refused to confirm their transaction until BFI indicated that the attack was resolved, and that the block containing the transaction in question achieved Bitcoin-finality (it is mathematically impossible now to reverse that VeriBlock block unless a 51% attack of Bitcoin occurred as well).

Eventually the attacker gave up and stopped building their offline chain (and performing PoP publications of it), because the victim they were trying to double-spend against refused to confirm their transaction until BFI indicated that the attack was resolved, and that the block containing the transaction in question achieved Bitcoin-finality (it is mathematically impossible now to reverse that VeriBlock block unless a 51% attack of Bitcoin occurred as well).