Translations:How VeriBlock PoP vBFI Protects Altchains/23/en
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Eventually the attacker gave up and stopped building their offline chain (and performing PoP publications of it), because the victim they were trying to double-spend against refused to confirm their transaction until BFI indicated that the attack was resolved, and that the block containing the transaction in question achieved Bitcoin-finality (it is mathematically impossible now to reverse that VeriBlock block unless a 51% attack of Bitcoin occurred as well).
