Difference between revisions of "Translations:How VeriBlock PoP vBFI Protects Altchains/25/en"

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Latest revision as of 19:38, 22 July 2021

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Message definition (How VeriBlock PoP vBFI Protects Altchains)
All attacks becomes very obvious to any observer:
* Not publishing PoP endorsements will result in the attacker's chain losing when released, even if they have more blocks/higher cumulative PoW/PoS weight/etc.
* Publishing PoP endorsements will notify all observers that an attack is occurring.
* Waiting too long (past the finality period) to publish PoP endorsements (such as mounting a surprise attack) will result in stale PoP that will lose during fork resolution, so no reorg can be caused
* Conflicting PoP Proofs makes consensus attacks extremely obvious to all observers. Everyone can then withhold activities that would cause any loss from overwritten transactions (such as an exchange confirming deposits or a merchant delivering goods).
TranslationAll attacks becomes very obvious to any observer:
* Not publishing PoP endorsements will result in the attacker's chain losing when released, even if they have more blocks/higher cumulative PoW/PoS weight/etc.
* Publishing PoP endorsements will notify all observers that an attack is occurring.
* Waiting too long (past the finality period) to publish PoP endorsements (such as mounting a surprise attack) will result in stale PoP that will lose during fork resolution, so no reorg can be caused
* Conflicting PoP Proofs makes consensus attacks extremely obvious to all observers. Everyone can then withhold activities that would cause any loss from overwritten transactions (such as an exchange confirming deposits or a merchant delivering goods).

All attacks becomes very obvious to any observer:

  • Not publishing PoP endorsements will result in the attacker's chain losing when released, even if they have more blocks/higher cumulative PoW/PoS weight/etc.
  • Publishing PoP endorsements will notify all observers that an attack is occurring.
  • Waiting too long (past the finality period) to publish PoP endorsements (such as mounting a surprise attack) will result in stale PoP that will lose during fork resolution, so no reorg can be caused
  • Conflicting PoP Proofs makes consensus attacks extremely obvious to all observers. Everyone can then withhold activities that would cause any loss from overwritten transactions (such as an exchange confirming deposits or a merchant delivering goods).