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Latest revision as of 19:38, 22 July 2021

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Message definition (How VeriBlock PoP vBFI Protects Altchains)
In the absence of such malicious attacking publications for a particular time period (measured in VeriBlock and Bitcoin blocks), the altchain has a mathematical guarantee that unless Bitcoin blocks themselves are reversed (Bitcoin experiences a 51% attack), those altchain blocks can never be replaced. This guarantee is provided by the Bitcoin Finality Indicator ("BFI") which indicates when an altchain block (and its included transactions) have achieved Bitcoin finality, meaning that Bitcoin itself would have to be 51% attacked in order to be able to fork the altchain block off the network and perform a double-spend. In the presence of such malicious attacking publications, everyone can see which altchain blocks are (and are not) threatened by the attack, and know not to finalize/confirm any transactions in such blocks until the attacker either succeeds in a reorg (but no double-spending occurred because nobody confirmed transactions in those blocks which were under attack), or the attacker gives up (and the cessation of malicious attacking publications extending the attacker's chain for a particular time period (measured in VeriBlock and Bitcoin blocks) provides the same mathematical guarantee, albeit delayed, that Bitcoin itself would have to experience a 51% attack in order for those previously-under-attack altchain blocks to ever be reorganized off the chain.
TranslationIn the absence of such malicious attacking publications for a particular time period (measured in VeriBlock and Bitcoin blocks), the altchain has a mathematical guarantee that unless Bitcoin blocks themselves are reversed (Bitcoin experiences a 51% attack), those altchain blocks can never be replaced. This guarantee is provided by the Bitcoin Finality Indicator ("BFI") which indicates when an altchain block (and its included transactions) have achieved Bitcoin finality, meaning that Bitcoin itself would have to be 51% attacked in order to be able to fork the altchain block off the network and perform a double-spend. In the presence of such malicious attacking publications, everyone can see which altchain blocks are (and are not) threatened by the attack, and know not to finalize/confirm any transactions in such blocks until the attacker either succeeds in a reorg (but no double-spending occurred because nobody confirmed transactions in those blocks which were under attack), or the attacker gives up (and the cessation of malicious attacking publications extending the attacker's chain for a particular time period (measured in VeriBlock and Bitcoin blocks) provides the same mathematical guarantee, albeit delayed, that Bitcoin itself would have to experience a 51% attack in order for those previously-under-attack altchain blocks to ever be reorganized off the chain.

In the absence of such malicious attacking publications for a particular time period (measured in VeriBlock and Bitcoin blocks), the altchain has a mathematical guarantee that unless Bitcoin blocks themselves are reversed (Bitcoin experiences a 51% attack), those altchain blocks can never be replaced. This guarantee is provided by the Bitcoin Finality Indicator ("BFI") which indicates when an altchain block (and its included transactions) have achieved Bitcoin finality, meaning that Bitcoin itself would have to be 51% attacked in order to be able to fork the altchain block off the network and perform a double-spend. In the presence of such malicious attacking publications, everyone can see which altchain blocks are (and are not) threatened by the attack, and know not to finalize/confirm any transactions in such blocks until the attacker either succeeds in a reorg (but no double-spending occurred because nobody confirmed transactions in those blocks which were under attack), or the attacker gives up (and the cessation of malicious attacking publications extending the attacker's chain for a particular time period (measured in VeriBlock and Bitcoin blocks) provides the same mathematical guarantee, albeit delayed, that Bitcoin itself would have to experience a 51% attack in order for those previously-under-attack altchain blocks to ever be reorganized off the chain.